A Terrorist Cell

Lavon Affair

A terrorist is a terrorist is a terrorist.

Notes To Chapter IX

328

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. The controversy over the creation of the State of Israel in 1947, the policies leading to this historical event and its implications in terms of explosive developments in the Middle East, have been the subject of thousands of books, articles and pamphlets, as well as innumerable diplomatic exchanges among the great and small powers directly or indirectly interested in this problem. The following summary of events, it is hoped, will throw some light on the major factors leading to the creation of the State of Israel.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, assimilation of Jews in Western European countries and their acceptance within the social, cultural and political life of each nation resulted in an influx of Jews from Eastern Europe who sought a better life in Austria, Germany, France, England and the United States. The emigration of large numbers of Jews to Western Europe and their economic and commercial success resulted in a wave of racial tension and anti-Semitism which came to a climax, in the twentieth century, in the Nazi movement in Germany. Certain Jewish leaders, particularly Moses Mendelssohn (1829-86) and Theodore Hertzl (1806-1904), alarmed at the process of assimilation in Western Europe, looked upon it as a threat to Jewish traditions and culture and took advantage of existing racial difficulties to preach the gospel of Jewish nationalism and to seek a solution to Jewish problems through the creation of a Jewish State. In 1896, Hertzl wrote in his Der Judenstaat: "The Jews have but one way of saving themselves--a return to their own people and a return to their own land." Modern Zionism, with its political and nationalistic ambitions, aimed at the creation of a Jewish State, gained support from the oppressed European Jews and its first Congress, held in Basel in 1897, formalized the program which eventually led to the creation of the State of Israel. And yet not all the Jewish leaders agreed on Palestine as being their goal. The so-called Territorialist Zionists, led by Dr. Israel Zangwill, were willing to settle for a Jewish home regardless of its geographical location, while the Zionists proper, under Dr. Chaim Weizmann, argued in favor of a Jewish State in

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Palestine--then a part of the Ottoman Empire. The Zionist Congress, which at first met annually and after 1901 every second year, received an offer from the British government in 1903 to permit Jews to settle in the African territory of Uganda as an autonomous community within the British Empire. Both Hertzl and Zangwill favored acceptance but they were opposed by Dr. Weizmann, who successfully maneuvered against the Territorialists; the Congress declined the offer and Palestine became the official target of the Zionist Organization. During the years that followed the 1903 decision, the Zionist movement undertook a world-wide campaign in order to bring more Jews into active participation in the movement and to gain political support from Western governments in general, and the British government in particular. Their campaign was without outward visible success until 1917. The beginning of World War I and the alliance between the Ottoman Empire and Germany marked a decisive turn of events in favor of the Zionist movement. The Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1915 (see chapter V, note 6), secretly negotiated between Britain, France and Zsarist Russia (made public and denounced by the Soviet government in 1917) divided the Ottoman Empire between the three power, giving Syria and Lebanon to France, Constantinople and the Dardanelles, under certain conditions to Russia, and Iraq and Palestine to Great Britain. This was followed, on November 2, 1917, by the so-called Balfour Declaration in which Sir Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, wrote to Lord Rothschild on the sympathy of the British government with the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Palestine, with 97 per cent of its population Arab, was a part of the projected Arab State under the McMahon correspondence (note 7, below) which was now being violated by the Balfour Declaration. In response to protests from Arab leader Sherif Husein, the British government issued a clarification in which Nation Home was distinguished from National State and the Foreign Office denied that the British government supported the creation of a Jewish National State. Nevertheless, the endorsement of the Declaration by Italy, France and the United States, its acceptance at the San Remo Conference of April 26, 1920, and its inclusion in the projected Treaty of Sévres (1920), which was aimed at the defeated Ottoman government (this was later replaced by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne,

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which recognized the Turkish Republic under Ataturk) made the Balfour Declaration an integral part of the British Imperial Policy in the Middle East. The implementation of the Sykes-Picot Treaty through the legal device called the mandate system made Palestine a British Mandate, opened its gates to Zionist immigration and resulted in terrorist activities of both Arabs and Zionist Jews, which form the bloody history of Palestine throughout the mandate period.

During the Cairo Conference of 1921, called to plan the future course of the British Imperial policy in the Arab world, Winston Churchill, the Colonial Secretary, carved out the autonomous state of Transjordania, reportedly over a bottle of brandy and a cigar, to satisfy the disgruntled Hashemite family of Sherif Husein. Husein's son Abdullah, was declared the ruler of the new state and his grandson, King Husein, is currently ruling the area, which since 1947 has been called the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Thus, the Cairo Conference established a de facto basis for the division of Palestine into Jordan and Israel which was consummated in 1947. For more information see Nahum Sokolow, History of Zionism, 1600-1913, 2 Vols (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1919); H.M. Kallen, Zionism and World Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Co., 1921); C.I. Janowski, The Jews and Minority Rights, 1848-1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933) and F.F. Andrews, The Holy Land under Mandate, 2 Vols (Boston: Houghton MIfflin Co., 1932). For the texts of documents on British policy in Palestine and the creation of Transjordania see J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and the Middle East, 2 Vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956), Vol.II, pp101-111, 156-159.

2. The Hebrew University at Jerusalem was opened by Lord Balfour on April1, 1925. For information on the University see Facts About Israel (Jerusalem: The Government Press OFfice, 1961), pp130-134.

3. Besides Uganda there were a number of other proposals for the settlement of Jews and the creation of an autonomous Jewish National Home. These ranged from the Island

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of Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean to Mesopatamia, Sina(?) and even Argentina. Dr. Hertzl, even after being committed to Palestine through the decision of the Zionist Congress mentioned above, was still ready to consider the possibility of colonization in other areas. The split over Uganda resulted in the creation of the Jewish Territorial Organization (ITO) under the leadership of Dr. Zangwill; the purpose of ITO was to dissociate itself from the Zionist Organization and "...to acquire a territory on the basis of autonomy for those Jews who cannot or do not wish to remain in their present countries of residence."  For details see Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State, Harvard Middle Eastern Studies No. 3 (Cambridge, Maa.: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp 152 ff.

4. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a Russian born Professor of Chemistry at the University of Manchester, and Nahum Sokolow, a Russian born journalist and a member of the Zionist Executive Committee who had come to England in 1914, were the two leading Zionist spokesman who were pressing to obtain the support of the British government for the Zionist cause. In March 1917 Sokolow went to Paris and Rome seeking endorsement of the Zionist program from France and Italy and he returned to London in June 1917 with a favorable letter from Jules Carbon, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. On July 18, 1917, Lord Rothschild submitteed to the British Foreign Office the Zionist draft and declaration of policy to be considered by the cabinet. After days of heated discussion, the draft was adopted in its revised form known as the Balfour Declaration and was part of a letter written by Sir Arthur to Lord Rothschild on November 2, 1917. The text of the letter was published in The TImes of London on November 9, 1917. See Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. II pp. 25-26.

5. In May 1917, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Arthur Balfour, paid a visit to the United States and tried to get the support of the American Government for the Zionist ambitions in Palestine. Sir Arthur discussed the question with Justice Brandeis, who was both a Zionist and a close adviser to the President. His attempt, supported by leading American Zionists, brought favorable

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response from such prominent officials as William J. Bryan, the former Secretary of State; Robert Lansing, currently Secretary of State; Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War; Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy; Col Edward House; Norman Hapgood; and many influential members of the Congress. Even President Wilson showed enthusiastic support when, in the course of a discussion with Brandeis, Frankfurter and Wise, he referred to himself a a Zionist. Not being at war with the Ottoman Empire at the time, the President did not wish to make public his views, but on October 16, 1917, President Wilson instructed Colonel House to approve, on the part of the United States government, the Zionist draft declaration which was being considered by the British government. After the declaration was issued, the Zionists concentrated their campaign on winning the support of other Allied governments; in this they were quite successful. France gave its formal approval on February 11, 1918 and Italy followed suit on February 23, 1918. On October 29, 1918, President Wilson gave his open support to the declaration in a letter addressed to Rabbi Stephen B. Wise. The Congress gave its support to the Balfour Declaration through a joint resolution signed by President Harding on September 21, 1922. See Lenozowski, The Middle East in World Affairs 3rd ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 77-93 and notes. For the text of the joint resolution endorsing the Declaration see Statutes of the United States: 1921-1922, Part I, p. 1012.

	6. The term Zionism, as explained in note 1, refers to a definite political and nationalistic movement and, as the author states, cannot be equated with Judaism any more than the term Arab could be equated with the religion Islam. A number of Jews—both before and after the declaration of Balfour,—have publicly opposed the Zionist movement. The grounds for opposition have not always been the same but public statements by anti-Zionist Jews contradict the contention of the Zionists that their political movement is identical with Judaism and the Jewish people in the world. See, for example, J.M.N. Jeffries, Palestine: The Reality (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939), pp. 141-147; Lenozowski, op. cit., pp. 77 ff. and Rabbi Elmer Berger,

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Who Knows Better Must Say So (new York: American Council for Judaism, 1955). When President Wilson finally gave his support to the Balfour Declaration (note 5, above), Dr. Chaim Weizmann called the action "one of the most important individual factors in breaking the deadlock created by the British Jewish anti-Zionists." Chaim Weizmann, Trial [&] Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann (New York, Harper, 1949), p. 208.

7. At the outbreak of World War I one of the aims of Arab nationalism was emancipation from Ottoman rule and Sherif Husein of Hojaz [sp?], the head of the Hashemite family and the Governor of Mecca, was one of the most enthusiastic leaders of the Pan-Arab movement. In February, 1914, a series of negotiations started between Abdullah, the second son of Husein, and Lord Kitchener, then British Agent and Consul General in Egypt, for British support of Arab national ambitions against the Ottoman government. Upon the Ottoman involvement in the war, the negotiations became the basis for the McMahon Agreement reached in a correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, acting on instruction of the British government, and Sherif Husein, which resulted in a military alliance between Arabs and the British. The Alliance provided for the formation of an Arab Army to fight against the Central Powers in return for which the British government promised to support the independence of the Arabs in the area bounded on the north by Turkey, on the east by the Iranian border down to the Persian Gulf and on the south by the Arab principalities of the Persian Gulf. As to the Western boundaries, Husein demanded the Mediterranean and the Red Sea; but the British government, while accepting the Red Sea boundary, excluded the coastal belt of Syria from the pledge; for the French Government had sought this territory since 1860. The McMahon Agreement never went into effect and apparently the British government never intended to honor its obligation under it, for—apart from the Balfour Declaration of 1917—while the Arab side of the agreement was being implemented, the British government was busy negotiating the secret Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916 (note 1, above), under which the area covered by the Agreement was divided between England and France. For the text of the letters exchanged between Sherif

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Husein and Sir Henry McMahon see Hurewitz, op.cit., Vol II, pp.13-17. For additional information see G. Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York: E. Hamilton, 1918); P.L. Hanna, British Policy in Palestine, (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942); Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. XXX, Cmd. 597L, 1939 and 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), COXLV (19382939), 2032, 3769.

8. In 1917 the total population of Palestine was 600,000, of whom 13,000 (3%) were Jews. By 1922, owing to the opening of the gates to Zionist immigration, the number of Jews in the country had reached 33,790. The Arab agitation against the British policy provoked Mr. Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, to write his well known 'Churchill Memorandum' in which he reassured the Arabs that the Balfour Declaration was not intended to turn Palestine into a Jewish State and that the Jewish immigration would be permitted to the extent justified by the economic capacity of Palestine. This, however, did not satisfy the Arabs and, moreover, Zionist immigration continued so that in 1939, when the British government decided to impose restrictions by cutting it down to 75,000 more for the ensuing five years, the Jewish population of Palestine had reached 445,457, or almost one-third of the total population, which was at the time 1,501,693. For detailed statistical information on Palestine see the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1945, information paper No. 20 (London: The B.I.I.A., 1946). See also Lenozowski, op. cit., Vol II, pp.103-106.

9. As stated before (Chapter V, note 6), the secret agreements of World War I providing for the division of enemy territories among the victorious powers were in violation of public statements made by various leaders of the Allies Powers on "self-determination" and the "rights of small nations" during the war years. To find a legal formula through which the imperialistic ambitions of the victorious powers could be satisfied, Article 22 of the League Covenant was devised; this made

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the advanced countries of the West the caretakers of the inhabitants of the former enemy territories. This was attributed to the facts that these people were not, as yet, "able to stand by themselves" and "the well being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation." Under agreements concluded later between the Allied and Associated Powers the former enemy territories were classified into A, B and C mandates in conformity with the categories mentioned in Article 22 of the Covenant. See [Great Britain] Parliamentary Papers, Vol II, Treaty Series No. 11, Cmd. 964, 1920, pp. 11-12. For a scholarly discussion of the Versailes Treaty up to 1929, see Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). For the full text of the Mandate Agreement on Palestine see the Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 152.

10. see note 8, above.

11. The stormy history of Palestine throughout the mandate period and the hostile reaction of other Arab countries to the British policy in Palestine forced the British government to set up a number of commissions to find a solution to the problem of Palestine. Each commission turned in a voluminous report and then a White Paper would be issued by the British government. Thus, for example, after the Wailing Wall incident of August 1929, when the first large scale attacks on the Zionists was undertaken by the Arabs, the British government set up the Shaw Commission on Palestine. After investigation, the Commission attributed the incident to "Arab hatred of the Jews and the disappointment of Arab hopes for independence." This was followed by the Hope-Simpson Commission of 1930 upon whose report was based the Passfield White of October 20, 1930, proposing a temporary stop to Jewish immigration and a ban on land purchase by Zionists in Palestine. There were a number of other commissions and White Papers, the most important of which was the Royal (Peel) Commission mentioned by the author, set up as a result of the crisis precipitated by the formation of the Arab High Committee in April 1936 and a general strike called by the Committee which

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lasted from August to October of that year. The Peel Commission Report, published by the British government on July 8, 1937, proposed that, since Arabs and Jews could not possibly get along together, the mandate system should be considered unworkable and abandoned in favor of a partition plan dividing Palestine into three states: (1) a Jewish State, comprising approximately one-third of the total territory; (2) an Arab State united with Transjordania; and (3) a British mandated territory comprising a strip from Jaffa along the raliway to Jerusalem, including both Jerusalem and Bethlehem. For the texts of documents and related papers see Abraham Tulin, Book of Documents, compiled and annotated on instructions of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (The Jewish Agency for Palestine , 1947), pp. 53-215.

12. The Peel Report was accepted by the Wold Zionist Congress on August 2, 1937, on the condition that it be revised in favor of the Zionist demands for more territory. A minority of the members of the Congress voted against it and it was generally condemned by the Zionists outside the Congress as a violation of the Balfour Declaration. The permanent Mandate Commission adopted the Report on August 20 and the British government also stated its agreement to the partition plan. On September 8, 1937, the Pan-Arab Congress at Bludan, Syria, voted overwhelmingly against the Report and demanded the termination of the mandate, the establishment of an independant Arab State of Palestine allied with Great Britain, and end to Jewish immigration and the abandonment of the prospective Jewish National Home, instead of which the Jews would have the status of a guaranteed minority within the Arab State. The split of the Zionists over the Peel Report and its rejection by the Arabs resulted in the postponement of the partition plan and the creation of a new Commission on January 4, 1938, under Sir John Woodhead to study the Peel Report further. See The New York Times, October 6, 13, and November 10, 1938. For the texts of the documents see Tulin, op.cit., pp. 35-38, 49-52, 97-99, and 100-111 and The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations (Cenova, Switzerland: The Information Section, League of Nations, 1937), Vol. VII, No. 8 (August 1937), pp 167-174. See also the following note.

13. The Woodhead Commission, after spending five months (April-August, 1938) in Palestine, reported to the British government that partition was impracticable. On November 9, 1938, the British government announced the findings of the Woodhead Commission, abandoned the partition plan and called a Zionist-Arab Conference to discuss the Palestine problem in London. The conference met in London in February, 1939 and lasted until March 17. Despite the efforts of non-Palestinian Arabs to effect a compromise, the Conference did not accomplish anything and closed on March 17 without reaching a settlement. This having failed, the British government issued its famous White Paper of May 17, 1939, which provided (1) an independent Palestine in which both Arabs and Jews would share in the government would be created within ten years; (2) during the transition both Arabs and Jews would be appointed as heads of government departments with British advisors; (3) after five years a constitution would be drafted providing for a Jewish Home; (4) immigration of Jews would be terminated within five years, during which period 75,000 new immigrants would be permitted to come into Palestine; and (5) the sale of new land to immigrants would be prohibited immediately. The British government approved the plan on May 23, 1939, but it was rejected unanimously by the Zionists, as well as by the great majority of Arabs. The outbreak of World War II created a temporary armed truce which flared up in new fighting and acts of violence in 1945. For the text of the documents and a discussion of events see J.C. Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. II, pp.218-226 and The Struggle for Palestine, (New York: Norton Book Co., 1950), pp. 67-111. See also Lenowski, op. cit., pp. 316-326.

14. During World War II the world Zionist movement began gradually to shift its reliance for support from London to Washington. On May 11, 1942, the Zionist Organization met in New York and adopted the so-called Baltimore Program presented to it by David Ben Gurion. The program called for the creation of a Jewish Army, the repudiation of the 1939 White Paper, and unlimited immigration into Palestine. Next the Zionists began to put pressure on Congressional leaders and high government

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officials for support of the Baltimore Program, and in February, 1944, a resolution was introduced into both Houses of Congress which, if passed, would have made the Baltimore Program the official policy of the United States government. It was the intervention of General Marshall, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that postponed the vote on the resolution at the last moment. General Marshall, on the basis of reports from the Middle East, informed Congressional leaders that such a resolution at that time would impair the war efforts of the Allied Powers. Despite this setback official Washington was generally in favor of the Zionist program and on August 31, 1945, President Truman sent a message to Prime Minister Atlee asking for admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine. In reply, the British Prime Minister proposed the formation of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine to study the matter. The American government accepted the proposal and the Committee completed its inquiry on April 20, 1946, and presented its Report to the two governments. See Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIV, No. 388 (May 13, 1946), pp.783-787. For the text of the Report see The Anglo-American Committe of Inquiry: Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, Department of State Publication 2536, Near Eastern Series 2 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946). See also Lenowski, op.cit., pp.326-332. For the British and the American members of the Committee see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII, No. 388 (December 16, 1945), pp. 958-959. See also note 20, below.

15. For the text of the executive order establishing the cabinet level committe discussed by the author see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIV, No. 364 (June 23, 1946), p. 1089-1090.

16. See Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XV, No. 372 (August 18, 1946), p.334, and No. 380 (October 13, 1946), pp. 669-670.

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17. The Grady Committee flew to London on July 10, 1946, and after negotiation with its British counterpart submitted its report to President Truman on July 24, 1946. The Report, known as the Grady-Morrisson Plan, provided for provincial autonomy leading ultimately to a bi-national federal state. This proved unacceptable to Mr. Truman. Mr. Truman rejected the proposal due to opposition of "members of the major political parties in the United States" and proposed substantial immigration of Jews into Palestine without waiting for a solution to the problem. He pledged American assistance to make immigration possible. The President also supported the Zionist proposal for "the creation of a viable Jewish State in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine."

According to James Reston of The New York Times, Mr. Truman's Palestine policy was attributable to political considerations. Two Democratic candidates, Mr. Mead and Mr. Lehman, were campaigning for the two highest political posts in the state of New York. Mr. Mead was seeking governorship and Mr. Lehman was after a seat in the United States Senate. The two candidates informed the White House that a statement favoring Zionism must be made if they were to win the election. On October 4, 1946, Mr. Truman issued the requested statement. Thus a vital question of foreign policy was decided of the basis of partisan political considerations. Mr. Bevin, the Labour Secretary for Foreign Affairs, subsequently deplored the fact that the Palestine issue had become the subject of local elections in the United States. According to C.L. Sulzberger of The New York Times, the British government was well on the way towards a solution of the Palestine problem on a cantonal basis "when President Truman upset the apple cart by making his speech demanding the immediate entry of 100,000 Jews." For Mr. Truman's rejection of the Grady-Morrison Plan, see Basic Documents, pp. 816-817. For Mr. Bevin's statement see The New York Times, February 26, 1947. For an evaluation of Mr. Truman's policy see Kermit Roosevelt, The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Politics, The Middle East Journal, Vol. II, No. 1 (January 1948), pp.1-16. The views of Mr. Reston and Mr. Sulzberger are from The New York Times, October 7, 1946, and December 8, 1947, as cited by Roosevelt, op. cit., pp.12-13.

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18. See note 15, above.

19. See notes 11-12, above.

20. On August 31, 1945, President Truman sent a letter to Prime Minister Atlee in which he informed the Prime Minister of the recent mission of Mr. Earl G. Harrison to inquire into "the present condition and the future fate" of displaced Jews. In his report to the President, Mr. Harrison, former United States Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization and at the time American representative on the Intergovernmental Commission on Refugees, recommended arrangements for immediate of Jews in Germany and Austria to Palestine. The report was the basis of President Truman's insistence upon the admission of 100,000 new Jewish immigrants into the country. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (note 14, above) in supporting the Harrison recommendation for the immediate admission of 100,000 new immigrants, also recommended (Recommendation No. 3) that Palestine "shall be neither Jew nor Arab" and that Arabs should not dominate Jews nor Jews Arabs. The recommendation urged the creation of a state in which the rights of both Jews and Arabs could be protected. Dr. Grady's reference to the proposal as the "Harris Plan" apparently refers either to the Harrison Report and the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry partially based on it, or to the report prepared by the British Civil Servant mentioned by the author. The plan is officially known as the Grady-Morrison Proposals or the Morrison Plan. For the text of the Harrison Report see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII, No. 334 (November 18, 1945), p. 790. For a discussion of the plan see Hurewitz, op. cit., 272-273.

21. For an enlightening discussion of similar pressures used by the Zionist lobbyists to change the votes of those members of the United States who opposed partition, see K. Roosevelt, op. cit., pp.13-15.

22. see note 17, above.

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22. On April 2, 1947, the government of the United Kingdom requested the calling of a special session of the General Assembly to consider the entire problem of Palestine. The General Assembly met on April 28 and May 15, 1947, and set up a United Nations Special Committee on Palestine composed of eleven members (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia) under the presidency of the Swedish delegate. The Committee was given "the widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine," and to report its recommendations, not later than September 1, 1947, to the regular session of the General Assembly. The Committee completed its work by September, 1947 and presented two plans for the settlement of the Palestine problem to the General Assembly. Both plans recommended the establishment of ann independent and economically unified Palestine at an early date but there were sharp differences on other matters. The majority plan, recommended by seven member of the Committee (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay) recommended the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state with the city of Jerusalem internationalized and administered by the United Nations. The minority plan, proposed by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, advocated a federated state of Palestine composed of two autonomous states, Jewish and Arab, and recommended that immigration into the Jewish section be permitted for three years with a committee formed of three Jewish, three Arab, and three United Nations representatives determining the number of immigrants in accordance with the absorptive capacity of the Jewish State. The Arabs favored the minority plan while the Zionists expressed willingness to accept the majority plan. On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly adopted the majority plan with some modifications. The Palestinian Arabs, supported by all the Arab states, refused to recognize the partition plan. The United Nations documents on Palestine are too numerous to be cited here. For a summary of the proceedings at the special session of the General Assembly convened at the request of

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the United Kingdom, see The Yearbook of the United Nations: 1946-1947 (Lake Success, N.Y.: UN Department of Public Information, 1947), pp. 276-303. For proceedings at the regular session of the Assembly (September-November 1947) and a summary of the majority and minority reports of U.N.S.C.O.P. and the final decision to partition Palestine see The Yearbook of the United Nations: 1947-1948, pp. 16, 27-28, 30, 227-281, 307, 402-451, 552, 622 and 917.

23. See the United Nations, Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Final Report of the UN Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, UN Doc. AAC35/6, Dec. 28, 1949.

24. On February 16, 1956, the Special Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Judiciary Committee was empowered to study the problem of refugees and make the necessary recommendations to the Senate. Subsequent to the report prepared by the subcommittee, the United States Congress, on March 2, 1957, authorized the Department to make available visas to displaced persons who qualified under the provisions of the Refugee Relief Act of Congress. See Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with the Emigration of Refugees and Escapees, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 1st Sess., 1957, Report No. 129, pp. 1 ff.  See also Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Sess., 1957, CIX, part 3, p. 2954.

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Title: "Summary of major events leading to the creation of the nation of Israel"
Truman Library - Documents on the Recognition of Israel

Master Races

41% of Israel's Jews favour segregation

• Poll reveals widespread anti-Arab sentiment
• Academics warn of racism 'becoming mainstream'

Chris McGreal in Jerusalem
Friday March 24, 2006
The Guardian

A poll of attitudes among Israel's Jews towards their country's Arab citizens has exposed widespread racism, with large numbers favouring segregation and policies to encourage Arabs to leave the country.

The poll found that more than two-thirds of Jews would refuse to live in the same building as an Arab. Nearly half would not allow an Arab in their home and 41% want segregation of entertainment facilities.

The survey also found 40% of Israel's Jews believe "the state needs to support the emigration of Arab citizens", a policy advocated by some far-right parties in the run-up to next week's general election.
... guardian.co.uk/israel/...

Central Commitment

	Protecting innocent civilians is a central commitment of our war plan. Our enemy in this war is the Iraqi regime, not the people who have suffered under it. G.W., March 26, 2003

Not Sacred, Abhorrent

from U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's 1919 King-Crane Commission Report, re:

ZIONISM

E. We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification of the extreme Zionist program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State.

(1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds predisposed in its favor, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled with the force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians have driven them to the recommendation here made.

(2) The commission was abundantly supplied with literature on the Zionist program by the Zionist Commission to Palestine; heard in conferences much concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims; and personally saw something of what had been accomplished. They found much to approve in the aspirations and plans of the Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the devotion of many of the colonists and for their success, by modern methods, in overcoming natural obstacles.

(3) The Commission recognized also that definite encouragement had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's often quoted statement in its approval by other representatives of the Allies. If, however, the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to -favoring "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," "it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights existing in non-Jewish communities in Palestine"-it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist Program must be greatly modified.

For "a national home for the Jewish people" is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.

In his address of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the following principle as one of the four great "ends for which the associated peoples of the world were fighting"; "The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery."
If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine-nearly nine tenths of the whole-are emphatically against the entire Zionist program. The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrenderthe land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the people's rights, though it kept within the forms of law.

It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist program is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria as our conferences clearly showed. More than 72 per cent-1,350 in all-of all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist program. Only two requests-those for a united Syria and for independence-had a larger support This genera] feeling was only voiced by the "General Syrian Congress," in the seventh, eighth and tenth resolutions of the statement. (Already quoted in the report.)

The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally thought that a force of not less than 50,000 soldiers would be required even to initiate the program. That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist program, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a "right" to Palestine, based on an occupation of 2,000 years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.

There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored, if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely Jewish state, however gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out of the fact that Palestine is "the Holy Land" for Jews, Christians, and Moslems alike. Millions of Christians and Moslems all over the world are quite as much concerned as the Jews with conditions in Palestine especially with those conditions which touch upon religious feeling and rights. The relations in these matters in Palestine are most delicate and difficult. With the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole.

	The reason is this: The places which are most sacred to Christians-those having to do with Jesus-and which are also sacred to Moslems, are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them.

It is simply impossible, under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians to feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody of Jews. There are still other places about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact, from this point of view, the Moslems, just because the sacred places of all three religions are sacred to them have made very naturally much more satisfactory custodians of the holy places than the Jews could be. It must be believed that the precise meaning, in this respect, of the complete Jewish occupation of Palestine has not been fully sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist program. For it would intensify, with a certainty like fate, the anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions of the world which look to Palestine as "the Holy Land."

In view of all these considerations, and with a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that
the project for making Palestine
distinctly a Jewish commonwealth
should be given up.